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Schwartz: State Disclaimers of Jurisdiction over Indians: A Bar to the McCa

COMMENT
STATE DISCLAIMERS OF JURISDICTION
OVER INDIANS: A BAR TO THE
MeCARRAN AMENDMENT?
INTRODUCTION AND SETTING

The Constitution of the State of Wyoming includes a
seldom referred to clause which disclaims the state's "right
and title" to the unappropriated public lands and to all
lands owned by any Indian or Indian tribe.' Additionally,
the Wyoming Constitution declares that Indian lands shall
remain under the "absolute jurisdiction and control" of the
United States Congress.2 The Wyoming disclaimer is substantially similar to clauses found in the Constitutions of
ten other western states.' Collectively, these disclaimers were
the result of negotiations between the federal government
and territorial representatives, and generally mirrored provisions in the various Enabling and Statehood Acts which
authorized statehood. 4
On February 22, 1982, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Northern Cheyenne v.
Adsit' that the State of Montana's constitutional disclaimer'
left Montana state courts without subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights.' The Indian water
rights at issue in Adsit were among those the State of Montana sought to adjudicate in state court along with all other
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.

1. The Wyoming Constitutional provision reads: The people inhabiting this
state do agree and declare that they forever disclaim all right and
title to the unappropriated public lands lying within the boundaries
thereof, and to all lands lying within said limits owned or held by
any Indian or Indian tribes, and that until the title thereto shall
have been extinguished by the United States, the same shall be and
remain subject to the disposition of the United States and that said
Indian lands shall remain under the absolute jurisdiction and control

of the congress of the United States; Wyo. CoNsT. art. XXI, § 26.
2. Id.
3. Those states are: Alaska (art. XII, § 12); Arizona (art. XX, §4); Idaho
(art. XXI, § 19); Montana (art. I); New Mexico (art. XXI, § 2); North
Dakota (art. III, . 1); Oklahoma (art. I, § 3); South Dakota (art. XXII);
Utah (art. III); Washington (art. XXVI, . 2).
4. Goldberg, Public La, 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 535, 567 (1975).

5. 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct.
4, 1982) (No. 81-2188).
6. MONT. CONST. art. L

7. 668 F.2d at 1085.
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non-Indian rights to the use of water from the Tongue River
and Rosebud Creek.8 The state claimed jurisdiction over the
federal rights involved, both Indian and non-Indian, pursuant to the McCarran Amendment.' The Amendment, passed
in 1952, granted the consent of the United States to be joined
as a "defendant in any suit.., for the adjudication of rights
to the use of water of a river system ... where it appears
that the United States is the owner of ... water rights...
and the United States is a necessary party to such suit."1
The Amendment does not mention federally reserved Indian
rights, but the United States Supreme Court determined in
the 1976 case Colorado River Water Conservancy District
v. United States" that the Amendment's language, policy,
and legislative history dictated that the federal" consent to
suit must be construed as reaching federal water rights
reserved on behalf of Indians."'
In Adsit, however, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Colorado River on the grounds that Colorado's Constitution, unlike Montana's contained no disclaimer of subject matter
jurisdiction over Indian lands."3 In Colorado River, according to the Adsit court, the McCarran Amendment operated
only to give Colorado personal jursidiction over the United
States. 4 The Amendment, in the Adsit court's view, could
not be interpreted as granting subject matter jurisdiction
over Indian water rights in a state like Montana, where the
state constitution disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian lands. 5
The Adsit court concluded: "The appearance that subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking in a state court in a disclaimer
state would only be defeated by a finding that the disclaimer
had been validly repealed."'"
Significantly, the Adsit decision is in direct conflict with
the Tenth Circuit case Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 1082-83.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1976).
43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976).
424 U.S. 800 (1976).
Id. at 810-11.
688 F.2d at 1084.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id.
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States."' Jicarilla,a case arising in New Mexico, involved a
similar McCarran Act proceeding in state court involving
federally reserved Indian water rights. Notably, the Tenth
Circuit held that New Mexico's Constitutional disclaimer
provision did not bar a McCarran Amendment proceeding in
state court.18 The grounds for this decision will be discussed
below.
Suffice it to say that Adsit and Jicarillaare of great
interest to those currently involved in Wyoming's Big Horn
Adjudication." The Big Horn Adjudication involves the
Adsit and Jicarillafacts: a McCarran Amendment proceeding involving the determination of federally reserved water
rights in state court in a disclaimer state. The tribes, of
course, look to Adsit as a way of escaping state court with
its elected judges whom the tribes view as vulnerable to
political pressures from a citizenry often hostile to Indian
interests. 0 The State, of course cites Jicarilla as necessary
to permit states to continue to control their own water destinies, in their own ways, in their own courts.2
In view of the Adsit-Jicarilla conflict, this comment
will examine state constitutional disclaimers in the hope of
shedding light on their proper interpretation. Attention will
be focused on both the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the meaning of disclaimers and the Court's
view as to the particular relationship of disclaimers to other
general principles of federal Indian law. Finally, the com17. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir. 1979).
18. Id. at 1131.
19. The Big Horn Adjudication was commenced on January 24, 1977, when
the State of Wyoming filed a complaint in the District Court of the Fifth
Judicial District for the determination of all rights to the use of water
in the Big Horn River System and Water Division 3. On March 22, 1979,
the district court referred the litigation to special Master Teno Roncalio
pursuant to Rule 53 of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure. The first
phase of the litigation, involving claims to federally reserved Indian water
rights, has been completed and the parties now await Special Master
Roncalio's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which will be submitted to the district court for review. This portion of the adjudication
alone created a mass of over 18,000 pages of transcript and a mountain
of legal fees running into many milions of dollars.
20. See Brief for Appellant Northern Cheyenne Tribe at 9, Northern Cheyenne
Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir. 1982).
21. See Brief for Amicus state of Wyoming in Support of Petition for Writ
of Certiorari at 9-10, Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1080
(9th Cir. 1982).
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ment will return to the Adsit-Jicarilla conflict. Both decisions will be discussed in light of the principles developed in
the comment with the intention of determining which court
reached the proper result.
The Supreme Court and Disclaimers
In 1832 the Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia"
laid out the basic principle that Indian nations are "distinct
communities" in which the laws of the states can have no
force "but with the assent of the [tribes] themselves, or in
conformity with treaties, and with the acts of Congress.""8
Worcester has thus long been cited for the proposition that
state jurisdiction over Indian territory is absolutely preempted by the federal government." This principle has
endured some twisting and pulling over the years, but, nonetheless, its basic thrust has remained largely intact.
As early as 1885, the Supreme Court recognized that
Worcester should not be read as prohibiting every assertion
of state power within the territory of the reservation. In
5 the Court recogUtah and Northern Railroad v. Fisher,"
nized that the Territory of Idaho had a legitimate interest
in regulating the activities of its non-Indian citizens, even
when those activities took place within a reservation. Thus,
the Court upheld the authority of the Territory to tax the
non-Indian railroad company operating on the Fort Hill
Indian reservation." "The authority of the Territory," held
the Court, "may rightfully extend to all matters not interfering with [federal treaty] protection."2 The Court indicated, however, that if the territorial tax had in some way
22. 10 U.S. 214, 6 Pet. 515 (1832). Worcester dealt with an attempt by the
state of Georgia to assert criminal jurisdiction over the Cherokee reservation.
23. Id., 10 U.S. at 243.
24. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973).
Worcester has been cited as the Supreme Court's first explication of the
tribal sovereignty doctrine. This doctrine recognizes an independent origin
of tribal power deriving, not from the federal government, but from the
tribes' status as sovereign governments. See COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAw 233-35 (1982 ed.).
25. 116 U.S. 28 (1885).
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 31.
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affected the rights of Indians it would not have been allowed
to stand."8
In 1896, the Supreme Court decided Draper v. United
States,29 a case arising in Montana state court involving the
murder of a non-Indian by a non-Indian on an Indian reservation. Draper, in allowing state court jurisdiction, relied
upon an earlier Supreme Court case, United States v. McBratney," which established the general proposition that a
state court could assert jurisdiction over crimes committed
by a non-Indian against a non-Indian by virtue of the state's
admission into the union on equal footing with the original
states. As did Fisher,McBratney subtly modified the Worcester principle by allowing some extension of state jurisdiction onto Indian lands without the express permission of
Congress.
Draper, however, differed from McBratney in that
Draperinvolved a state constitutional disclaimer."1 Yet, the
Draper Court held this difference was inconsequential, that
Montana could exercise the same jurisdiction over nonIndian crimes on the reservation as did New York in McBratney. 2 The purpose of Montana's disclaimer, in the
Draper Court's view, was "to prevent any implication of the
power of the state to frustrate the limitations imposed by
the laws of the U.S. upon title of lands once in an Indian
reservation.... "I' Montana's disclaimer, the Draper Court
indicated, could not be read to leave Montana with any lesser
jurisdictional power than any other state.8 4 In other words,
the disclaimer did not specially limit Montana's power,
but merely prevented the implication that Montana, by virtue of its statehood, gained new power over Indians. This
conclusion suggests that the Draper Court viewed disclaimer
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 31-32.
164 U.S. 240 (1896).
104 U.S. 621 (1882).
164 U.S. at 243-44.
Id. at 247.
Id. at 246 (emphasis added).
The Draper Court held that since "equality of statehood is the rule, the
words relied on here to create an exception cannot be construed as doing
_
so, if, by any meaning, they can be otherwise treated." Id. at 244.
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provisions as merely maintaining the status quo in regard
to state jurisdiction over Indian lands.
That status quo, as Fisher and McBratney had previously indicated, allowed for certain extensions of state
jurisdiction onto Indian land for the purpose of regulating
non-Indian activity. To the extent that allowing such jurisdiction modified Worcester's absolute preemption principle,
Draper indicated that state disclaimer provisions should be
interpreted in such a way as to facilitate this modification.
Several Supreme Court decisions after Draper generally support the view alluded to above that state constitutional disclaimers neither add to nor subtract from the
jursidictional power a state could otherwise assert over Indian lands.5 These cases, which prohibited state extension
of jurisdiction onto Indian lands for various purposes,
stressed the exclusive preemptive power of Congress over the
affairs of Indians; state constitutional disclaimers, when
mentioned at all, were generally cited merely as affirmations
of this principle of federal preemption in Indian affairs.
Research indicates no cases where the Supreme Court has
prohibited otherwise allowable state jurisdiction solely because of the state's disclaimer provision. To the contrary,
the cases, at least until 1959, indicate that disclaimer provisions have made no difference at all in the Court's decisions." Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "as a general
35. See United States v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357 (1933) (State had no authority
to prosecute non-Indian defendants charged with larceny committed on
reservation because of United States Constitutional authority over its
Indian wards and their property. Id. at 362. State constitutional disclaimer
in no way changes this principle. Id. at 365) ; United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913) (Congressional regulation of introduction of liquor
onto reservation a legitimate exercise of federal power. Id. at 49. Such
regulation not in conflict with state disclaimer. Id. at 38) ; United States v.
Sutton, 215 U.S. 291 (1909) (State prohibited from regulating introduction
of liquor onto reservation primarily because of federal statute. Id. at 295.
State disclaimer provision supports this result. Id. at 295-96) ; United
States v. Rickert, 188 U.S. 432 (1903) (Constitutional power vesting in
Congress the power to dispose of and make all needful rules for property
belonging to the United States prohibited state tax on Indian lands. Id. at
439. State constitutional disclaimer supports this conclusion. Id. at 441).
36. One striking example of this appears in the Supreme Court cases of The
Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867), and The New York Indians,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867). These cases, decided in the same year, involved the authority of the states of Kansas and New York to tax reservation Indians. The Organic Act, Statehood Act and Constitution of Kansas
all disclaimed jurisdiction over Indian land within the state, yet the Su-
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matter these clauses were not necessary, since the Supreme
Court has sustanied the same federal and tribal authority

in states admitted without such clauses.37
Williams v. Lee: The Tribal Infringement Test

In 1959 the Supreme Court decided the landmark case
of Williams v. Lee." Arising in Arizona, Williams involved
a non-Indian merchant operating on the Navajo Reservation

who sued in state court for the collection of a debt owed by
Navajo customers. In denying Arizona state court jurisdiction, the Williams Court relied primarily upon Worcester's

preemption principle: "Significantly, when Congress has
wished the states to exercise this power it has expressly
granted them the jurisdiction which Worcestor v. Georgia

had denied." 3 This principle, the Williams Court noted, had
come "to be accepted as law. 0
As earlier cases had foreshadowed," the disclaimer pro-

vision in Arizona's Constitution was unimportant to the
Williams Court. Indeed, the existence of the provision was
mentioned only in passing in a footnote."'

In this respect,

Williams fit squarely within the string of Supreme Court
precedents establishing federal preemption as the principle
limitation of state jurisdiction over Indians.
Williams, however, went beyond a restatement of the
Worcester doctrine by also discussing those situations where
the Worcester doctrine had been "modified" to allow an asser-

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

preme Court in The Kansas Indians declared that the taxing question
should be resolved by "the construction of treaties, the relations of the
general government to the Indian tribes, and the laws of Congress." 72 U.S.
(5 Wall.) at 752. In denying Kansas' power to tax, the Court held that,
"[a]s long as the United States recognizes [tribal] national character they
are under the protection of treaties and the laws of Congress, and their
property is withdrawn from the operation of State laws." Id. at 757. In
spite of New York's lack of a disclaimer provision, the Court in The New
York Indians reached the same result. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) at 771-72. Again,
the Court relied on Congressional laws and treaties.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 268 (1982 ed.).
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
Id. at 219.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
358 U.S. at 222 n.10.
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tion of state jurisdiction over Indians or their land."" Thus,
the Williams Court pointed out that a state court could hear
suits brought by non-Indians against non-Indians for actions
arising on a reservation." Additionally, the Court noted, a
state's regulatory jurisdiction could extend onto a reservation for the purposes of regulating non-Indians.45 Finally,
the Court approved state jurisdiction when invoked by an
Indian in an action brought against a non-Indian." State
jurisdiction in these situations, according to the Williams
Court, was not preempted by any governing acts of Congress. 7 In addition, such jurisdiction did not interfere with
"essential tribal relations" or the "rights of Indians."". The
Williams Court concluded: "Essentially, absent governing
acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the
state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to
make their own laws and be ruled by them."4
This "tribal infringement test", as it has come to be
called, did not truly "modify" Worcester's preemption principles in regard to a state's power over Indian affairs." As
has been pointed out, some state power touching Indians or
their land had always been allowed as a legitimate exercise
of state jurisdiction over its territory and citizens. The
"tribal infringement test" merely purported to clarify in a
general way when a state, if not preempted from doing so,
could assert power which in some way touched Indians or
Indian land.
43. Id. at 219. More accurately, the court described situations where a state
has been allowed to assert jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation
lands. It pointed out only one situation where the state could assert jurisdiction over an Indian: When an Indian invoked the power of the state
court against a non-Indian. Id.
44. Id. at 220.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 219.
47. Id. at 220.
48. Id. at 219.
49. Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
50. One could argue that the test also affirmed a tribe's inherent sovereignty
as an additional bar to state power. Whether this is true or not, it
would not seem to change the outcome in cases involving a question
of permissible state power. In this context, general preemption principles
would seem to prohibit any state power which interfered with a tribe's
sovereignty. This is not to say, however, that the concept of inherent tribal
sovereignty would not have significance in other contexts. Inherent tribal
sovereignty, for example, might be asserted against federal actions which
interfered with that sovereignty.
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Nonetheless, as will be discussed, some courts interpreted
the Williams test as somehow broadening a state's power over
Indians. This interpretation was encouraged for a time by
the Supreme Court's careless application of the test in
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan. 1 In Kake, the Supreme
Court upheld the power of Alaska to prohibit the non-reservation use of fish traps by the Thlinget Indians. Such a
conservation measure, the Court noted, was not preempted
by any federal law," nor did it interfere with reservation
self-government because its application was "off-reservation."'I Kake went on, however, to hold that "even on reservations state laws may be applied to Indians unless such application would interfere with reservation self-government.
This language in Kake prompted many state courts to
apply Williams' tribal infringement test in situations not anticipated by the Williams Court. For example, the Supreme
Court of North Dakota held in Fournier v. Roed 5 that a
state sheriff could arrest an Indian member of the Sioux
tribe by entering the reservation without a warrant." In
upholding the sheriff's action, the North Dakota court held
that "the arrest did not interfere with the reservation selfgovernment nor impair any right granted or reserved to the
petitioner by federal law or treaty." 7 Similarly, other state
courts allowed various other assertions of state power over
reservation Indians or reservation land by holding that such
assertions did not interfere with tribal self-government."
These courts, finding no explicit federal law or treaty pro51.
52.
53.
54.

55.
56.

57.
58.

369 U.S. 60 (1962).
Id. at 63.
Id. at 75.
Id. (emphasis added). This holding is particularly striking in light of the
Williams Court's statement that "[clongress has also acted consistently
upon the assumption that the States have no power to regulate the affairs
of Indians on a reservation." 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (emphasis added).
161 N.W.2d 458 (N.D. 1968).
Signifciantly, North Dakota had not assumed criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country pursuant to a federal law which authorizes such assumption
upon proper action by the state legislature. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588
(1953) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976).
161 N.W.2d at 467.
See State v. Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967); Powell v.
Farris, 94 Wash. 782, 620 P.2d 525 (1980).
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hibiting the state action in question, held that a simple finding of "non-infringement" authorized that action.
Such an extension of the tribal infringement test to
include situations involving reservation Indians and their
lands was not intended by Williams. The Supreme Court
finally made this clear in McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commission." In McClanahan, the Court held that Arizona's
personal income tax could not extend to Indians on the Navajo reservation. McClanahan noted that no treaty or federal
law explicitly prohibited such a tax, yet the "backdrop" of
Indian sovereignty demanded that the Navajo treaty and
federal laws be interpreted to preclude the extension of
state laws to Indians on the reservation."
McClanahan went on to hold that since the appellant
was an Indian and her income was derived wholly from
reservation sources, her activity was totally within the
sphere which the relevant treaty and statutes left for the
Federal Government and the Indians themselves."' The Court
stated bluntly: "[W]e reject the suggestion that the Williams test was meant to apply in this situation. It must be
remembered that cases applying the Williams test have
62
dealt principally with situations involving non-Indians."
There were no cases, according to the McClanahan Court,
which held that federal legislation and treaties could be ignored "simply because tribal self-government has not been
infringed." 3 Kake, the Court clarified, was not such a
case. 6
McClanahan, then, in a sense brought the law back to
where it had been before the confusion engendered by Kake
and Williams. "State laws," according to the McClanahan
Court, "generally are not applicable to tribal Indians on an
Indian reservation except where Congress has expressly pro59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

411 U.S. 164 (1973). But see infra note 67.
Id. at 174-77.
Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
Id. at 180.
Id. at 180 n. 20.
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vided that State laws shall apply." 5 This principle generally echoed the 150-year-old doctrine stated in Worcester:
"The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can
have no force.., but with the assent of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
Congress." 6 McClanahan, along with other post-Worcester
cases, "modified" this principle only by recognizing that in
cases involving non-Indians, or non-reservation land a state
may sometimes extend its power over Indians or their property without explicit tribal or Congressional permission. In
these situations, where "essential tribal relations" were not
involved, or where the protections of federal laws or treaties
were not impaired, or where tribal sovereignty was not
infringed upon, state power was authorized.
Perhaps it is more helpful to view the "tribal infringement" test not so much as a "modification" of the Worcester
principle, but as a clarification of the scope and limit of the,
principle. The test, as a basic proposition, stands for the
idea that federal preemption has boundaries. The further
the focus of state power moves away from Indians and their
property, the weaker grows the bar of federal preemption.
Federal preemption does not necessarily bar state power
when non-Indians or non-reservation land are involved. This
is quite different, however, from saying that federal preemption is not an absolute bar to state power when only
Indians on Indian land are involved. In such a situation,
there is only one "unmodified" rule: the state is preempted
from asserting its power. 7
65. Id. at 170-71 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

845 (1958)).

66. 10 U.S. at 243, 6 Pet. at 561.
67. But see Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463
(1976). In Moe, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana state law which
required reservation Indians to add a sales tax onto the price of cigarettes
sold to non-Indians. Such a tax appears to be state regulation of reservation Indians. The Court held, however, that the tax was more properly
viewed as a regulation of non-Indians with a concomitant incidental
burden on Indians. Moe may be an aberration limited to its specific facts,
but it does seem to place a small cloud over the freedom of reservation
Indians from state regulation. See Note, State Jurisdiction on Indian
Reservations, 13 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1036 (1978).
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Kake v. Egan and ConstitutionalDisclaimers
The McClanahan Court appeared to clarify that the
tribal infringement test was not intended to apply in situations involving Indians on a reservation. In those situations McClanahan, and even Williams, noted that state
power was preempted by federal treaties and statutes.
Kake v. Egan, however, took a more limited view of preemption under those circumstances and appeared to approve
of broad exercises of state power over Indians if that power
did not interfere with reservation self-government. Although
McClanahan seemed to cut back on Kake's broad implications, those implications have nonetheless lived on through
their impact upon the interpretation of constitutional disclaimers.
As has been noted earlier, the Supreme Court has
generally interpreted disclaimer provisions as supporting
its views on preemption. These disclaimers, it appears, have
amounted to nothing more nor less than the state's constitutional echo of the principle of federal preemption of Indian
affairs. In this light, it is not surprising that Kake, with
its more limited view of federal preemption, includes an
extensive discussion limiting the scope of Alaska's constitutional disclaimer.
Kake's Proprietary/RegulatoryDistinction:The Alaska
Statehood Act, like the constitutional disclaimers of the
other Western states, disclaims "all right and title" to
Indian lands and provides that such lands shall remain subject to the "absolute jurisdiction and control" of the United
States. 8 After reviewing the relevant legislative history
pertaining to Alaska statehood, the Kake Court concluded
that the above language disclaiming "right and title" to
Indian lands placed a limitation only upon a state's "proprietary" authority - not its "governmental" or "regulatory" authority." This language, held Kake, was intended
68. Pub. L. No. 85-508, § 4, 72 Stat. 339 (1958). Alaska's constitutional disclaimer differs slightly in that it subjects Indian lands to the "absolute
disposition" of the United States. ALASKA CONST. art. XII, § 13.

69. 369 U.S. at 69.
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to insure that statehood would neither extinguish nor establish Indian land claims against the United States."'
The Court went on to note that there was scant attention paid in Congress to the disclaimer's language vesting
"absolute jurisdiction and control" over Indian lands in the
United States."' The Court cited legislative history indicating
that the words "absolute jurisdiction" were not intended to
mean "exclusive jurisdiction,"" and were not intended "to
oust the state completely from regulation of Indian property." 3 Although the Court did not expressly so hold, it
indicated that the disclaimer's "absolute jurisdiction and
control" language was similarly intended to limit only the
state's "proprietary" and not its "regulatory" authority."4
Kake's interpretation of the Alaska disclaimer has
been cited extensively by other courts interpreting various
other state disclaimers. 5 This, however, is unfortunate because the Kake Court's interpretation appears to be, at best,
only partly accurate. A close reading of the legislative
history, for example, indicates substantial disagreement over
the meaning of the Alaska disclaimer. Ralph Barney, the
then Chief of the Indian Claims Branch of the Justice
Department who drafted the Alaska disclaimer for the
Statehood Act, testified during Senate Hearings that the disclaimer was intended to preserve the status quo in regard
to state jurisdiction over Indians."e That status quo, in
Barney's view, included the retention of police power over
reservations in the federal government." The disclaimer,
added Barney, "would take the jurisdiction to operate such
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 71.
The Court cited, for example, the remark of Senator Jackson: "All that you
are doing here is a disclaimer [sic] of proprietary interests . . . ." Id. at
69 (quoting Alaska Statehood: Hearings on S. 50 Before the Senate Comm.
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 286 (1954) (remarks
of Senator Jackson).
75. See Arizona v. Manypenny, 445 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Ariz. 1977); State v.
Danielson, 149 Mont. 438, 427 P.2d 689 (1967) ; State v. District Court of
Ninth Judicial District, 617 P.2d 1056 (Wyo. 1980).
76. Alaska Statehood: Hearings on S. 50 Before the Senate Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 284 (1954) (remarks of Ralph
Barney, Chief, Indian Claims Branch, U.S. Justice Dept).
77. Id. at 286.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
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lands as were not turned over to the State, retaining those
authorities to the Federal Government. You would operate
just as you now operate the territory."7 8 This testimony
would seem at odds with the view expressed in Kake that
the disclaimer limited only the state's "proprietary" interest in Indian lands.
Such a view also conflicts with Supreme Court precedent involving state disclaimers. Many Supreme Court decisions, as noted earlier, have cited state disclaimers as support
for the prohibition of state power over Indians in clearly nonproprietary areas.79 In United States v. Sutton,8" for example, the Supreme Court prohibited the state of Washington from regulating the introduction of liquor onto a reservation by holding that such regulation was properly within
the realm of the federal government. The Court cited Washington's disclaimer provision as support for its holding.8
It could hardly be argued that the regulation of liquor constitued anything but a "nonproprietary" power within the
meaning of Kake, yet the Supreme Court in Sutton indicated
that Washington had disclaimed this power in its enabling
Act.
Finally, Congress' enactment of Public Law 280,82 which
granted states the authority to assume criminal and civil
jurisdiction over reservation Indians, indicates that state
disclaimers extend to more than a mere proprietary interest
in Indian lands. In authorizing the states' assumption of
jurisdiction, Congress specifically set apart those states with
constitutional disclaimers, assuming that those states would
have to repeal their disclaimers by constitutional amendment
before Public Law 280 jurisdiction could be validly accepted.83 Public Law 280, then, illustrates the Congressional
view that state disclaimers constitute general obstacles to
the assertion of state jurisdiction. Presumably, if state dis78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
See supra text accompanying note 36.
215 U.S. 291 (1909).
Id. at 295-96.
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976).
Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 590 (1953), repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-284,
§ 404, 82 Stat. 79 (1968) codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976).
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claimers were deemed to limit only a state's "proprietary"
interest in Indian lands, their repeal would be unnecessary
to the state's assumption of civil and criminal jurisdiction
over those lands.
In setting forth the above discussed proprietary-regulatory distinction, the Kake Court was apparently elaborating
upon the principle that "absolute" federal jurisdiction does
not necessarily mean "exclusive" federal jurisdiction. In this
respect, the Court was merely restating the old idea that in
some circumstances a state may assert its sovereign power
over its citizens and territory in a way that touches Indians
on their lands. As has been discussed, this idea was the basis
for "modifications" of the absolute preemption principle of
Worcester, and was at the heart of the Williams Court's
"tribal infringement tests". Unfortunately, however, the
Kake Court's proprietary-regulatory distinction overstated
the idea in an apparent attempt at clarifying it.
Again, the McClanahandecision seems to have corrected
the misleading implications of Kake. In denying Arizona
the authority to tax reservation Indians, McClanahan cited
Arizona's constitutional disclaimer along with other federal
statutes and treaties as supporting the proposition that the
taxation of reservation Indians was totally within the province of the federal government and the Indians themselves."
Thus, the McClanahan Court treated Arizona's disclaimer
not as a special, isolated limitation upon the state, but as an
aspect of preemption that could not be viewed apart from
preemption principles.
From this perspective, the McClanahan Court could
agree with the holding in Kake that a state disclaimer vesting "absolute jurisdiction" over Indian lands in the federal
government did not invariably dictate "exclusive" federal
jurisdiction." The Court in McClanahan,however, was quick
to note that Kake's authorization of residual state power
"came in the context of a decision concerning the fishing
84. 411 U.S. at 172-78.
85. Id. at 176 n. 15.
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rights of non-reservation Indians.""s Kake's holding that
"absolute" was not invariably "exclusive" did not, according
to McClanahan, "purport to provide guidelines for the exercise of state authority in areas set aside by treaty for the
exclusive use and control of Indians.' 'sT In those areas, McClanahanindicated that the jurisdiction of the federal government was indeed exclusive. This conclusion is consistent
with McClanahan's holding that Williams' tribal infringement test was not meant to apply in situations involving
reservation Indians because of the federal government's
total preemption of state power in these situations."s
Thus McClanahan appears to have clarified what many
of the pre-Williams decision indicated: state disclaimer provisions neither add to nor subtract from preemption principles. Just as these principles do not always demand exclusive federal jurisdiction, state disclaimers may be interpreted
to allow some assertions of residual state power. The Court
in McClanahan emphasized, however, that in situations involving reservation Indians state power was totally preempted by the federal government. Thus, in these situations
the Court indicated that a disclaimer's language vesting
"absolute" control in the federal government should be interpreted as meaning "exclusive" federal control.
Public Law 280 and Disclaimers
The above discussion has generally suggested that state
constitutional disclaimers should not be viewed apart from
principles of federal preemption. That is, the disclaimers
mean nothing more than that in regard to Indians and their
lands, federal law is the governing law. In this respect,
disclaimer provisions do not as a matter of federal law constitute separate, independent bars to the assertion of state
power over Indians; rather, disclaimers merely reaffirm
that federal law controls the extension of state power over
Indians.
86. Id. (emphasis in original).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 58-60.
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This conclusion is not made doubtful by the provisions
of Public Law 280 requring states with disclaimers to amend
their constitutions before accepting civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservation Indians. As was earlier pointed out,
Congress apparently feared that state constitutional disclaimers constituted independent obstacles to the state's assumption of jurisdiction."9 Such a fear, however, was clearly
unfounded. The Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that the Constitution "and the laws
of the United States" shall be the supreme law of the land,
any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the
0 Thus, Congress had the obvious
Contrarynotwithstanding.""
power to grant the states jurisdiction over reservation Indians regardless of state constitutional disclaimer provisions.
Congress' conditioning of the state's acceptance of jurisdiction by requiring state constitutional amendments was a
result more of caution than of legal requirements. Legislative
history indicates that Congress was concerned that "any
legislation in [this] area should be on a general basis, making
provisions for all affected States to come within its terms.
... ,,I' Congress apparently intended to make certain that disclaimer states were not excluded from the terms of Public
Law 280 through the uncertain legal ramifications of state
constitutional provisions. As the Supreme Court pointed out
in Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 2 Public Law 280
"was intended to facilitate, not to impede, the transfer of
jurisdictional responsibility to the States.""3
Interestingly, the Yakima Court held that Public Law
280 did not necessarily require state constitutional amend89. See S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1953). Perhaps this fear was
more a result of speculation as to the opinion state courts would have
towards their disclaimers in deciding whether the state could accept P.L.
280 jurisdiction. The counsel for the Indian Affairs Committee noted that
federal permission to the states to amend their constitutions "may be
unnecessary, but by some state courts it may be interpreted as being
necessary." Hearings on H. R. 1068 Before the House Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1953) (quoted in Washington
v. Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 492 n. 36 (1978)).
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI (emphasis added). In addition, the Commerce Clause

grants Congress the power to regulate commerce "with the Indian tribes."
91.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
S. REP. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 reprintedin 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. &

AD. NEWS 2409, 2414.
92. 439 U.S. 463 (1978).
93. Id. at 490.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1983

17

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 18 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 4

192

LAND AND WATER LAW REvIEw

Vol. XVIII

ment to accept jurisdiction." Whether the amendment process
was necessary to accept Public Law 280 jurisdiction was,
in the Yakima Court's view, purely a question of state law. 5
In Yakima, the Court upheld a decision of the Washington
Supreme Court that state legislative action accepting partial
Public Law 280 jurisdiction constituted sufficient positive
state action to comply with the conditions of Public Law
280." Yakima thus emphasized that state constitutional disclaimers do not, as a matter of federal law, constitute independent barriers to the assertion of state power over reservation Indians.
Adsit, Jicarilla:Indian Water and Disclaimers
As was pointed out at the beginning of this article,
JicarillaApache Tribe v. United States and Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit involved McCarran Amendment proceedings for the adjudication of rights to the use of water
in New Mexico and Montana." The 10th Circuit in Jicarilla
held that New Mexico's disclaimer provision did not negate
the jurisdiction of Arizona state courts to adjudicate Indian
water rights pursuant to the McCarran Amendment. Adsit,
however, held that Montana's disclaimer provision prevented
Montana state courts from asserting subject matter jurisdiction over Indian claims to the use of water.
In light of the above discussion regarding the relationship of disclaimer provisions to general principles of federal
preemption, it appears that the Tenth Circuit reached the
correct result in Jicarilla.This result, however, was arguably
reached through the application of partially incorrect analysis.
The JicarillaDecision
The Jicarillacourt based its conclusion that New Mexico's disclaimer did not prohibit the adjudication of Indian
94. Id. at 493. The Supreme Court noted that the express terms of Public Law
280 required constitutional amendment only "where necessary." 25 U.S.C.
§ 1324 (1976).
95. 439 U.S. at 493.
96. Id.
97. See supra text accompanying notes 5-18.
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water rights primarily on three different theories. First,
the court held that New Mexico's disclaimer could be interpreted in such a way as to allow the assertion of state jurisdiction in this area. 8 Second, the court held that the McCarran Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in
Colorado River Water Conservancy District v. United States,
implicitly modified the New Mexico disclaimer to allow the
state to accept jurisdiction over the adjudication of Indian
water rights.99 Third, the court held that there was ultimately
no conflict between a McCarran Amendment adjudication of
Indian rights and the New Mexico disclaimer provision.'
Interpretation of the Disclaimer: The Jicarilla court
accepted the Supreme Court's interpretation of disclaimer
0 ' Thus, the Jicarilla
provisions as expressed in Kake v. Egan.1
court held that New Mexico disclaimed only a "proprietary"
interest in Indian lands.1 2 The court viewed a state action

involving a general water rights adjudication as a nonproprietary action."0 Further, the court accepted Kake's
broad application of the tribal infringement test by generally
approving of non-proprietary state action when such actions
did not interfere with reservation self-government or federal
rights.'0 4 Citing Kake, the Jicarilla Court noted that such
"noninfringing" state action could apply even to reservation
Indians. 0
As has been suggested, Kake's narrow interpretation of
state disclaimers was at best misleading, and at worst incorrect. 0 ' Such a narrow view of disclaimers was not supported by previous case law and only weakly supported, if
at all, by Congressional understanding of the provisions.
Further, McClanahan noted that the "tribal infringement"
test was not intended to apply to situations involving reservation Indians. In these situations, McClanahanindicated that
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

601 F.2d at 1131-35.
Id. at 1131.
Id.
Id. at 1133-35.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1133.
Id. at 1135.
Id. at 1134.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-82.
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state disclaimers vesting "absolute jurisdiction" in the federal government should be interpreted as supporting "exclusive" federal jurisdiction.
It is suggested that the use of water on Indian lands by
Indians is clearly the type of situation which the McClanahan
Court held to be totally within the jurisdictional sphere of
Congress and the Indians. State constitutional disclaimers,
it has been argued, should be interpreted to support the basic
proposition of exclusive federal preemption in situations involving reservation Indians. Jicarilla's narrow interpretation of the New Mexico disclaimer is inconsistent with this
notion.
McCarranAmendment Modification of Disclaimers:As
a secondary grounds for its decision, the JicarillaCourt held
that the McCarran Amendment worked an implicit "modification" of the New Mexico disclaimer so as to allow state
01 7
jurisdiction over the adjudication of Indian water rights.
The court's reasoning on this point appears to have been
prompted by the Jicarilla Tribe's argument that Public Law
280 procedures were required for a state to assume the civil
jurisdiction necessary to adjudicate Indian water rights. 0 s
Such procedures, the Tribe argued, were not satisfied by the
enactment of the McCarran Amendment; the McCarran
Amendment simply did not "amend, modify or repeal New
Mexico's disclaimer" as required by Public Law 280.09
The Jicarillacourt, however, disagreed with this argument. The McCarran Amendment, held the court, dictated
that "subject matter jurisdiction should be recognized as
allowable in the state courts of the general water rights
adjudication proceeding.""11 In recognition of this principle,
the court held that the McCarran Amendment implicitly
modified "as necessary" New. Mexico's Enabling Act disclaimer provision."' Although the court did not so expressly
107.

601 F.2d at 1131.

108. Id. at 1130.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1131.
111. Id. The court did not indicate that the state constitutional disclaimer, based

upon and required by the Enabling Act disclaimer, was also modified by the
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hold, it appears that the court presumed that such an implicit modification of New Mexico's disclaimer provision
satisfied the requirements of Public Law 280.
It is suggested, however, that the court's recognition
of an implicit modification of New Mexico's disclaimer, presumably in accordance with Public Law 280 procedures,
merely served to confuse the issues. The court could have
avoided the subject by noting that the express terms of Public
Law 280 do not apply to a state's assumption of civil
jurisdiction for the purposes of adjudicating Indian water
rights." 2 By venturing into the murky world of Public Law
280, the Jicarillacourt diverted its attention from the central issue of the case: Do disclaimer provisions conflict with
the McCarran Amendment's federal grant of jurisdiction to
the states to adjudicate Indian water rights?
The McCarran Amendment and Disclaimers: The Jicarilla court answered the above question in the negative."'
The answer, however, was given almost as an "aside"; further, the answer was given only after the court had eviscerated the New Mexico provision through its narrow interpretation and by its holding that the McCarran Amendment
had implicitly "modified" the disclaimer. It is suggested
that the court, by relying upon preemption analysis, could
have reached the same conclusion without stripping state
disclaimer provisions of their intended meaning.
It has been the premise of this comment that state disclaimer provisions exist only to reaffirm the principle that
federal law is controlling law in regard to Indians and their
McCarran Amendment. It did, however, suggest that the modification of
the Enabling Act provision authorized New Mexico to assert jurisdiction
over Indian water pursuant to state statute. Presumably, New Mexico's
state statue granting exclusive jurisdiction to the state court in which a
general adjudication was initiated, was viewed by the Jicarilla court as the
necessary modification of the state constitutional disclaimer. See id.
112. Public Law 280 reads in pertinent parts as follows:
(b) Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance,
or taxation of any real or personal property, including water
rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the United States or is subject to a
restriction against alienation imposed by the United States. ...
18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976).
113. 601 F.2d 1131.
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lands. The McCarran Amendment's waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity in state proceedings for
the adjudication of water rights was intended to vest state
courts with the necessary jurisdiction for the proper and
efficient disposition of those rights.114 The Supreme Court
held in Colorado River Water Conservancy Districtv. United
States, that the language and underlying policy of the
McCarran Amendment dictated "a construction including
Indian [water] rights in its provisions."' 15 Thus, the McCarran Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court,
constitutes federal law allowing the exercise of state court
jurisdiction over the adjudication of Indian water rights
as part of a general stream adjudication. As a matter of
federal law, state constitutional disclaimers vesting "absolute
jurisdiction and control" over Indian lands in the federal
government should not be viewed as creating additional
legal obstacles to the state's acceptance of federally granted
jurisdiction. By accepting such jurisdiction, a state has not
run afoul of its own constitutional provision providing for
absolute federal control over Indian affairs. Such an acceptance, to the contrary, is authorized, defined, and limited
by federal law and is, therefore, consistent with the principle of absolute federal control expressed in disclaimer
provisions.
The Adsit Decision
The Ninth Circuit in Adsit agreed with the Jicarilla
Court that the Supreme Court's construction of the McCarran
Amendment allowed states to assert jurisdiction over Indian
In the administration of and the adjudication of water rights under
state laws the state courts are vested with the jurisdiction necessary for the
proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the interlocking
of adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order of action affecting
one right affects all such rights. Accordingly, all water users on a stream,
in practically every case, are interested and necessary parties to any court
proceedings. It is apparent that if any water user claiming to hold such
right by reason of the ownership thereof by the United States or any of its
departments is permitted to claim immunity from suit in, or orders of, a
state court, such claims could materially interfere with the lawful and
equitable use of water for beneficial use by the other water users who are
amenable to and bound by the decrees and orders of the state courts.
S. REP. No. 775, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1951).
115. 424 U.S. at 810.
114.
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water rights.11 This allowable jurisdiction, however, in the
Adsit court's view included only assertions of personal jurisdiction and not subject matter jurisdiction. 1" ' The Adsit
court went on to hold that Montana's constitutional disclaimer provision left Montana state courts without subject
matter jurisdiction over Indian lands. 18 Since the Adsit
court could not read the McCarran Amendment to amend
Montana's disclaimer, it held that the Montana state court
lacked the "jurisdictional prerequisites" to adjudicate Indian
water rights."'
The Adsit court's holding that Montana's disclaimer
provision effected a waiver of state subject matter jurisdiction over Indian lands represented a novel approach to the
interpretation of disclaimers. Such an approach, however,
is ripe with serious theoretical problems. First, if a state
disclaimer provision waives state subject matter jurisdiction
over Indian lands, it would also seem to waive personal
jurisdiction over Indian tribes. 2 ' If this were true, then by
the Adsit court's analysis, a state court would also lack
personal jurisdiction over Indian tribes in a McCarran
Amendment proceeding because the McCarran Amendment
could not be read to amend a state constitution. Yet, the
Adsit court conceded that, indeed, the McCarran Amendment
granted state courts personal jurisdiction over Indian tribes
in McCarran Amendment proceedings.
A second, more serious problem lies in the Adsit court's
implication that if the Montana constitution contained no
disclaimer, then Montana would possess subject matter
jurisdiction over Indian lands. This conclusion, however, is
simply incorrect. The Supreme Court in McClanahan made
it quite clear that the limits of state power over Indians
and their lands are to be defined by federal statutes and
116. Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Adsit, 668 F.2d 1084 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3218 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 81-2188).
117. Id. at 1085.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. The Adsit court gave no reason why the state's waiver should be limited to
subject matter jurisdiction.
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treaties- 1 21 not by state constitutional provisions. Further,
the Yakima decision clearly indicated that Public Law
280 was intended to confer "subject matter" and "geographic" jurisdiction upon both disclaimer and non-disclaimer states.12 The message is clear: Regardless of disclaimer provisions, states have no subject matter jurisdiction
over Indian affairs absent federal law conferring such
jurisdiction.
In this light, the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
McCarran Amendment in Colorado River Water Conservancy District v. United States must be read as granting the
states subject matter as well as personal jurisdiction to
adjudicate Indian water rights. If the McCarran Amendment did not grant such subject matter jurisdiction then
the states would clearly lack that jurisdiction - regardless
of a disclaimer provision in the state's constitution. Although
the Colorado River decision spoke only in terms of the
McCarran Amendment's general grant of jurisdiction to
the states, 1 23 it is a necessary implication of the decision

that this general grant of jurisdiction included subject matter jurisdiction. Such a federal grant of jurisdiction, subject
matter and personal, is not defeated by a state disclaimer
provision which points to federal law as the source of state
jurisdiction over Indians.
CONCLUSION

The Adsit and Jicarilladecisions indicate the confusion
currently surrounding the interpretation of state disclaimer
provision. This confusion was bound to occur. For too long
courts had expressed only a vague understanding of disclaimers and their relationship to preemption doctrines.
Hence, some courts promulgated the mistaken view that
disclaimers could be viewed in a vacuum, independent of
preemption. By distinguishing and limiting the meaning of
disclaimers to reach individual results, these courts have
121.

411 U.S. at 172.

123.

424 U.S. at 809.

122. Washington v. Yakima Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 465, 472-74, 493, 498 (1979).
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diverted attention from the fundamentally symbiotic relationship between disclaimers and preemption.
It should be remembered that disclaimer provisions
generally resulted from the demands of the federal government. As a condition to statehood, the states relinquished
their jurisdiction and control over lands held by the federal
government. In light of these beginnings, it would be ironic
if a state were unable to accept federally granted jurisdiction due to its federally compelled disclaimer provision.
Such a result would seem to lose the forest for the trees.
The McCarran Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Colorado River, represents the intention of
the federal government that states possess the necessary
jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights. To interpret
state disclaimer provisions in such a way as to negate such
jurisdiction would seem to run counter to federal Indian
policy. To thwart federal Indian policy was surely not the
intended purpose of state disclaimers.
WILLIAM P. SCHWARTZ
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